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Executive Summary 
 
 
 
• The question of Kaliningrad Region should be considered: 
- as an important issue in the light of Russian internal policy 
- in the context of Russian relations with the EU 
- in the context of Russian relations with countries neighbouring with the 
region.  
 
• Russia’s approach towards the region originates from the philosophy of 
power, which the country has developed after the fall of the USSR. The 
authorities use international issues as an opportunity to enhance their 
status in the eyes of the nation and the society. All conflict situations in the 
international arena may be used as a pretext to mobilise the society and to 
re-emphasise importance of the central administration as the institution, 
which decides about all-Russian affairs. 
 
• Official foreign policy of the government of the Russian Federation is 
focused on Russian cooperation with the EU.  Foreign affairs are 
subordinated to internal objectives such as consolidating democratic rule in 
Russia, establishing a market economy that would efficiently serve current 
economic relations and improving Russians’ living conditions. This results in 
a pro-Western and pro-European tendency in Russian foreign policy, which 
includes acceptation and support for the process of the EU enlargement. At 
the same time Russian authorities are governed by an imperative to 
maintain territorial integrity of the Federation. Only with great difficulty do 
they recognize exceptional status of the region within the Russian 
Federation. Government actions show a lack of a coherent concept of a 
strategy towards the region.   
 
• The army may use strategic importance of the region to gain advantage 
over other pressure groups in the country. This may limit the process of 
opening up of the region towards the EU.  
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• Spreading of infectious diseases is a serious problem faced by the 
Kaliningrad region. Rising count of HIV infections is tied to the increasing 
number of drug addicts and alcoholics. Although in previous years most 
infections were observed among drug addicts, it can be feared that the 
virus will start to spread among persons who do not use drugs. Kaliningrad 
region has syphilis infection rates two times higher than mainland Russia, 
where syphilis already occurs more often than in other European countries. 
Low incomes of district’s citizens and bad financial situation of the local 
health care system contribute to the spreading of another disease - 
tuberculosis. 
 
• The way in which the issue of Kaliningrad is approached by authorities in 
Moscow, especially the President’s administration, shows signs of a conflict 
upon symbols. Arguments issued by the President and his representatives 
during negotiations relate to fundamental principles that are virtually 
impossible to discuss. They would speak about national pride, human rights 
or attempts to infringe upon Russian national integrity.   
 
• Local authorities, especially governor Vladimir Yegorov with his 
administration and part of deputies of the Kaliningrad Duma (local 
parliament), conform in their official statements to the policy of the 
government in Moscow and wait for a signal to act.  On the other hand 
central authorities ignore local ones in terms of the dispute with the EU. 
This is done in line with the general rule of centralisation, on which the 
Russian state is based, especially in international relations. 
 
• Kremlin wants the enclave to become a key transit node of that part of 
Europe, which would give Russia independency from energy supplies 
through the territory of Lithuania. Kaliningrad region would then become a 
gateway between Russia and Europe. Worth noting is the inconsistency of 
actions taken by the government Federal Development Programme for the 
Kaliningrad region till 2010 does not include any investments into region’s 
industry, despite the fact that one of its main goals is a shift from import to 
production/export economy.  
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• A discrepancy is at the heart of Russian policy on the Kaliningrad region, 
stemming from a fear about Russia’s territorial unity, as well as from a 
general specificity of Russian political tradition, which was always reluctant 
to allow authentic autonomy of its regions. Central government understands 
the specificity of region’s current situation, but tries to solve the arising 
problems through centralised means – delegating a special envoy to the 
region, who in his activities disregards local level authorities.  
 
• The EU wants to export stability and safety and at the same avoid 
importing crime, contraband and other negative economical and social 
phenomena. The questions of transit and visas cannot be considered 
separately from these issues.  
 
• The EU cooperates with Russia within The Cooperation Council between 
the EU and Russia, with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) serving as a base of all enterprises undertaken by governments of 
member states. Denmark, Germany and Sweden are among countries 
most involved in helping the region.  
 
• Ten Russia-EU summits have been held in the framework of Russia-EU co-
operation. Kaliningrad became a live issue around 2000.  At the last summit 
(Brussels, 11 November  2002) the EU accepted the conditions of granting 
Russian citizens Facilitated Transit Documents (FTD) and Facilitated Rail 
Travel Documents (FRTD). However, EU refused Russian demand for visa-
free transit by high-speed non-stop trains and declared the proposal 
infeasible at the moment. Russia received a promise that in the next year 
(2003) independent consultants will produce a feasibility study of the high-
speed train construction. It was further declared that discussions 
concerning this issue would be continued in the future. Implementation of a 
visa-free transit scheme has to be preceded by cooperation on a regular 
basis between Russia and EU in regard to immigration policy. Russia also 
has to fulfil its commitment to sign a readmission agreement until 30 June 
2003.  
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• Poland has opposed Russian demands for the visa-free transit since the 
very beginning. Polish approach has met with the support of the EU. In July 
2002 Poland was excluded from talks about visa-free transit and Russia 
issued an official statement that Poland is not considered a transit country.  
 
• Strategy on the Kaliningrad region is part of both Polish foreign policy and 
Polish-Russian relations. Polish government considers eastward extension 
of the EU an opportunity for the region. To eliminate the sense of isolation 
and to improve living standards of the region’s population, Poland is willing 
to begin comprehensive cross-border and local co-operation with the region 
and active participation in EU programmes. In sum, Polish strategy 
converge with that of the EU. 
 
• Lithuania is against further isolation of Kaliningrad and insists on 
comprehensive co-operation with the region. It has agreed to the conditions 
of the November Russia-EU summit, but has also demanded guarantees of 
Lithuanian accession to the Schengen acquis and additional financial 
support from the EU.   In Lithuania, critical voices also surface, which 
believe that summit conditions are degrading for Lithuania.   
  
• Economic analyses carried out in Kaliningrad region indicate that EU 
enlargement would particularly weaken small and medium business and will 
not negatively affect major economical enterprises. Owners of local 
companies accuse Russian institutions of lack of sufficient involvement and 
tardiness in adjusting Russian procedures to EU requirements. There are 
also fears of possible increase of prices of energy, other products imported 
from neighbouring countries or costs of transport through new EU member 
states. This would decrease buying capacity of Kaliningrad’s residents.   
 
• The issue of the introduction of visas at the borders is not only a matter of 
solving technical obstacles or limiting the right to travel. It involves certain 
expenses for a region, which is second poorest in the whole of Russian 
Federation, taking into their gross regional product per head. 
 
 
 
 
9
•  Research findings indicate that for most citizens of the Kaliningrad region,  
charges for visas and passports, as well as need to switch to more 
expensive means of transport, will constitute a significant financial burden 
for family budgets.   
 
• Research findings confirm the position of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which states that Poland is not a transit country for residents of the region.  
 
• Residents of Kaliningrad region have ambivalent feelings about EU 
enlargement in the context of region’s future economic situation. The 
majority is pessimistic. Negative consequences of future EU enlargement 
are most often mentioned among the older generation.  We assume that in 
this group the largest percentage of respondents still thinks in categories 
imprinted on their minds in the times of the Soviet Union.  
 
• There are no significant differences between views on introduction of visas 
between respondents who travel to other regions of Russia or abroad and 
those who never leave the enclave. This might be proof of the fact that 
people form their opinions not only through individual experience of travel 
but also from other sources, i.e. media campaigns or politicians’ 
statements. 
 
• Even those who have not recently visited other regions of Russia or have 
never travelled abroad can deem the introduction of visas a limitation of 
their potential ability to travel.  Since they are being flooded with information 
about the region being cut away from the rest of the country and about 
future difficulties, they perceive changes as a threat.   
 
• The majority of population does not see any positive consequences of the 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement. They regard introduction of 
visas as a potential obstacle in travelling to other parts of Russia or abroad 
and connect this with a possible worsening of living conditions of their 
families.  
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• Vast majority of the region’s population believes that Russian government 
has not made best endeavours to enable them to travel freely to and from 
mainland Russia. Therefore they do not consider the EU candidate 
countries and member states as solely responsible for their future 
discomfort.  
 
• With regard to the specific situation of Kaliningrad region, most of its 
residents believe that it deserves special treatment from the Russian 
Federation. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In order to analyse problems of Kaliningrad, as seen from the Russian perspective, 
we have to listen to the opinions of numerous subjects: representatives of central and 
local authorities, of local business and of nongovernmental organisations. The 
collected data has to be compared with views shared by the citizens of the region 
Particular subjects define the issues that emerge from the new circumstances 
differently. They would often avoid making explicit statements. Mismatches between 
those opinions can reveal the compound nature of the previously mentioned issues.  
 
This report contains analyses based on data from bibliographical and press sources 
about Kaliningrad region, as well as on interviews conducted by experts of the 
Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) in September 2002 with representatives of local 
government, NGOs and local businessmen in Kaliningrad. The report also includes 
findings from a survey research ordered by the ISP and carried out on a sample of 
1004 respondents by GfK Russia in Kaliningrad region in the period between August 
and October 2002. 
 
The issues posed by the Kaliningrad region are not only the matter of Russian 
Federation’s foreign policy. Russian approach to the problem in the international 
arena originates from a particular internal policy targeted at regaining control over 
country’s regions by central administration. 
 
Principal arguments that emerge during negotiations with the EU, such as the 
question of limiting country’s sovereignty or human rights, are part of the negotiating 
ritual. Russian authorities start with a firm negotiating position at the beginning of 
each negotiation, in order to manifest their patriotism and unhesitating stance in front 
of the society. Eventually they shift to a more pragmatic approach and a certain level 
of compromise can be reached. It should be noted that all proposals of solutions 
leading to a compromise came from the EU representatives. 
 
Theoretically, there are two possible strategies of Moscow government towards 
Kaliningrad region. One of the possibilities is decentralisation leading to more 
autonomous relations between Moscow and the region, creating a possibility of an 
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integration of some sort with the EU in the future. Reunification, which means 
reconstruction of previous direct control of the central authorities over the region, is 
the second strategy.  Moscow is currently acting as if it has chosen the second 
solution. It is exemplified in sending President’s special envoy Dmitry Rogozin to the 
region. One could consider it an attempt to introduce direct presidential reign. The 
person who was officially appointed for this post is known for his anti-western and 
dogmatic attitude.  
 
A discrepancy is at the heart of Russian policy on the Kaliningrad region, stemming 
from a fear about Russia’s territorial unity, as well as from a general specificity of 
Russian political tradition, which was always reluctant to allow authentic autonomy of 
its regions. Putin’s presidency is characterised by a return to a centralisation policy, 
expressed in both formal and informal limiting of the importance of institutions of 
democratic rule and of the separateness of Federation’s members. Presidential 
initiative that led to the creation of so called federal districts led by officials nominated 
by the President, made right after Putin’s coming to power, is a good example of 
such policy. The process of renewed centralisation creates greatest paradoxes in 
case of the Kaliningrad region. Central authorities, understanding region’s specificity, 
try at the same time to solve the arising problems using centralised means, for 
instance by delegating a special envoy, who acts with disregard for local level 
institutions. 
 
During talks with the EU, only most obvious issues, such as free transfer of residents, 
are mentioned. However, it seems that the problem of Kaliningrad region constitutes 
of something more significant than just the concerns brought up during negotiations, 
such as visas, electricity transfer, transit of goods or the fisheries limits. The 
statement on facilitated scheme for the cross-border transit of region’s residents, 
which was achieved during the November summit in Brussels, shows that the issue 
of visas, which drew strong media interest, was in fact easy to solve. The real 
problem faced by the government in Moscow and the EU countries is that an enclave 
incompatible in regard to living conditions and all other standards is to remain within 
the boundaries of united Europe. Kaliningrad will be a unique case inside EU 
borders. It is worth remembering that Switzerland, which does not belong to the 
European Union, does not vary form the surrounding countries in living standards. 
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The situation in Kaliningrad region is quite different. The clash of misaligned logics of 
the two economical systems, administration structures, public services etc., might 
turn it into a zone of instability.   
 
To surround the region with the thick wall of Schengen borderline may result in a 
decrease in the cross-border flow of persons. Furthermore, it may affect the informal 
economy sector, which probably forms the basis of the region’s economy. And it 
would not bring the region any profits in turn. Apart from being a visa travel regime, 
the Schengen Agreement is also an economic tool, which increases control at 
Union’s external borders and simultaneously liberalises transfer of persons within the 
boundaries of the EU. Therefore, we should take care of real issues emerging as a 
result of the collision of the two incompatible logics. On one side, the logic of 
Kaliningrad region is based on intentionally generated ambiguities in the system of 
tax and duty relaxations that create informal economy structures. On the other, the 
logic of Schengen aims at preventing such economical pathologies. In effect this may 
lead to a sudden breakdown in the region’s economy, which shall cause a major 
social crisis.  
 
Russia has to decide whether to take further measures to isolate the region in the 
name of maintaining Federation’s territorial integrity or to elaborate a model of 
gradual integration of the region with the EU, at least on the ground of economical 
standards unification.  And this is the question that Russia has to be asked.  
 
It seems that the last decade, during which an opening of the region towards 
neighbouring countries could have been observed, established the basis for local 
level cooperation. The implementation of the Schengen Agreement regulations 
should therefore focus on eliminating past pathologies rather than impairing that 
cooperation.   
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1. Kaliningrad Region in Regard to Russian Internal and    
Foreign Policy  
 
 
 
Process of enlargement of the European Union and the likely eastward extension of 
European borders made Kaliningrad region a permanent and priority element of a 
dialogue between the European Union and the Russian Federation.  Specificity of the 
geopolitical situation of this Russian enclave become a key issue, as it will soon 
become a separated island among an integrated European structure. Russian 
authorities are concerned about possible isolation of the region and demand abolition 
of visas (which are to be introduced by Poland and Lithuania in 2003) for its citizens 
travelling between the region and the rest of Russian territory.  To justify a more and 
more radical attitude, Moscow brings up the issue of violating the freedom of 
movement of Russian citizens within their own country, which is guaranteed by 
international law standards. Besides, Russia considers it groundless that its citizens 
should be dependent upon decisions made by authorities of a foreign country or 
organization, such as the EU.  On the other hand, we have to take into consideration 
the characteristics of region’s localisation in relation to currently candidate countries, 
which are about to become members of the EU (their accession is planned for 2004). 
As EU members these will accept acquis communautaire regulations and soon 
afterwards will become states of the Schengen acquis (this is planned for years 
2006-2008). Those regulations place many responsibilities, also in relation to the 
protection of the borders. The Moscow-Brussels talks, after many difficult stages of 
negotiations, finally reached a compromise (Russia-EU Summit in November 2002). 
The discussions about the situation in Kaliningrad region however, are often very 
distant from Kaliningrad itself. Research, whose findings are analysed in this report, 
had been carried out over the period between September - October 2002, before the 
previously mentioned summit was held. Nevertheless, they reflect attitudes that have 
been present in the Kaliningrad region for a long time.  
 
The case of Kaliningrad region should not be discussed only in the context of 
relations with the EU, which will surround its territory in a short time. Kaliningrad is 
also an important issue in Russia’s internal politics, and an attitude towards this 
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dilemma has originated from a certain philosophy of power, which has developed in 
Russia since the fall of the USSR. It is no secret that the authorities use international 
issues to improve their status inside the country and among the society. Multiple 
examples from the modern history of Russia prove that skilful management of crisis 
situation provides the establishment with an opportunity to implement their own 
agendas. Let us only mention the accusation of violating human rights of Russian 
citizens made against Latvia or Russia’s objections against NATO extension, which 
was described as an attack on the country. Radical anti-Western campaign led by the 
Russian Federation after the intervention of Western forces in the Kosovo region is 
another example out of a great number of such cases.  Nonetheless, when the 
dramatic tension dissipates, the situation may become diametrically different, which 
is proved by the shift in Russian attitude towards NATO. It may seem that Russia’s 
only true problem since the fall of the USSR and the reigns of Jeltzin’s administration 
has been the weakness of central power in face of regional aspirations. All crisis 
situations occurring on the international arena may serve to strengthen social 
mobilization and to reaffirm the significance of central administration as the sole actor 
that decides about all-Russian affairs. Argumentative approach also allows the 
government to manifest its firm stance when it comes to protecting national pride and 
importance of Russia. As such it is a reaction to Russia’s post-imperial complex.  
This scheme is also visible in the case of Kaliningrad region.   
 
 
1.1. Possible governmental strategies towards the region 
Salomon Ginsburg, a deputy of Kaliningrad Duma, anticipates two possible ways of 
resolving the dispute about the functioning of Kaliningrad as an enclave within the 
EU1. First, there is the possibility of decentralising and allowing local authorities to 
participate in solving the issues that emerge in relation to the EU enlargement. Even 
some form of integration of the region with the EU seems feasible, since otherwise it 
could easily become a black hole on the map of Europe. However, it seems that 
Russian government prefers an opposite strategy -- the strategy of reunification and 
                                                 
1 See: Iwanow W., Wolność słowa w obwodzie kaliningradzkim na przykładzie lokalnych środków 
masowej informacji  (Freedom of Speech in the Kaliningrad Region. The Example of Local Mass 
Media) in: Obwód Kaliningradzki – Przegląd  Faktów, Wydarzeń, Opinii (Kaliningrad Region – Review 
of Facts, Events and Opinions) No. 5, 2002, Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. W. Kętrzyńskiego, 
Olsztyn, pp. 9-17. 
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centralisation of power within the Russian Federation. They blame the EU and its 
candidate countries for supporting separatism in the region. According to Russian 
authorities, introduction of visas serves as proof of their viewpoint. Often, the issue of 
limiting or dividing Russia’s sovereignty is also being brought up. The most 
spectacular manifestation of reunification strategy (although separatist tendencies2 in 
the region are really low, at an approximate level of about 5%, according to S. 
Ginsburg, Bat nad enklawą (Whip over Enclave), Obwód Kaliningradzki… Nr 6-7, p. 
19) was the designation of Dmitry Rogozin, who is well known for his anti-Western 
speeches, unwilling to compromise and a stalwart defender of Russia from the West, 
as a special envoy of the Russian President. This is a clear signal for local authorities 
and the rest of Russian society that the issue of Kaliningrad is an all-Russian problem 
that affects country’s integrity.  Local authorities are neglected during selection of 
foreign delegations and discussions about the status of their region. For political 
power elites, expressing their attitude towards the issue of Kaliningrad is a great 
opportunity to manifest their patriotism. Such approach is visible in the 
pronouncements of representatives of a whole spectre of political parties, from 
radical National-Bolsheviks up to liberal Jabłoko. 
 
 
1.2. Military concerns in the Kaliningrad region 
 
Before 1990 the district was a highly isolated zone. In October 1990, USSR’s Highest 
Council abolished the regime of isolation in the Kaliningrad region, which therefore 
became accessible to citizens of other countries3.  Kaliningrad has been considered 
for a long time a strategically important zone and in the 1990s it was considered the 
most militarised territory in Europe. Military potential of the region was to be engaged 
during a future war in an attack on the Danish straits.  However, this massive military 
grouping has been in recent years significantly reorganised. The number of stationing 
navy units has been reduced to the size of a flotilla, although the name “Baltic Fleet” 
                                                 
2 The pro-Western Baltic Republican Party is the only one representing strong separatist tendencies in 
the region of Kaliningrad. Its chairman, who is a great supporter of the referendum about the affiliation 
and the future status of the region, Sergey Pashko postulates that a fourth Baltic republic should be 
established which should become a member of the EU in the future. 
  
3This decision was tied to the so-called 2+4 Agreement, signed on 12 August 1990 and ratified on 13 
August 1990. The agreement declared good standing, partnership and cooperation between USSR 
and German Federal Republic.  
 
 
 
18
remained to maintain force’s prestige. In case of an eventual conflict arising in the 
future, small naval units could be used to paralyse Baltic see transport. Number of 
military personnel in the region equals approximately 25 thousand and doubles if 25 
thousand enlisted in other armed services are also considered. Together with their 
families they constitute approximately 10% of region’s population, whose opinion is 
very influential.  Present governor, Vladimir Yegorov, who has been elected in 2000 
also derives from the Fleet headquarters (Admiral Yegorov used to be a commander 
of the Baltic Fleet). Strong position of the military lobby is one of the region’s 
characteristic features. In some issues, the military lobby can exercise influence over 
the regional administration through Yegorov himself and many other officers, who 
have connections in the administration and business environment.  
 
Military lobby is interested in securing sufficient supplies for the military units. Today 
there emerges a question, raised by Russian newspapers, of soldiers who in 
accordance with the Russian law and military regulations are not allowed to have 
passports, because they have access to confidential information. These soldiers will 
now have to travel by more expensive airplanes or ferries instead of relatively cheap 
trains. The best solution for the military would be the introduction of sealed trains, 
which could also carry supplies for military units. The issues related to the transfer of 
army units within the Russian Federation are also considered important by region’s 
authorities.  
 
Introduction of permanent naval connections with mainland Russia forces the Baltic 
Fleet will have to share a fragment of the harbour and its wharves in Baltijsk. This is 
strongly disapproved by army authorities and even caused a reaction by central 
authorities.  
Citizens of the region have to face consequences of a long-term stationing of Soviet 
troops in the past. Environmental consequences of weapons storage, possibly 
including chemical or nuclear armament, remain unknown4. 
                                                 
4 Environmental problems are also caused by open-cast mines of amber, peat and brown coal. Still, 
greatest damage to the environment is caused by the emission of waste into the Baltic Sea. 
Kaliningrad is second, after Petersburg, city on the Baltic coast with largest sea pollution. Kaliningrad 
recently became a leading site for illegal sinking of toxic chemical waste. For example, in 2002 40 
tonnes of such waste, mainly currently banned pesticides, were discovered. Nuclear waste is also 
stored in the region (Galeotti M., Kaliningrad at the Crossroads, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 
2002). 
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Strategic importance of the district may become an advantage for the military lobby 
as a pressure group in Russia. It can lead to a delay in the process of opening the 
district towards the European Union, which in a longer perspective would cause 
stagnation of the economy. 
 
 
1.3. Epidemiological danger5 
 
AIDS is a serious problem faced by the Kaliningrad region. Spreading of HIV is 
connected with a growing number of drug addicts and alcoholics. In 1997, there were 
137 addicts for each 100,000 residents. In 2002, this number quadrupled. In previous 
years, most HIV infections were observed among drug addicts. Currently fears arise 
that infections will occur ever more often among persons not using drugs. We lack 
reliable data concerning the spreading rate of the disease. Statistical data shows, 
that in 1997 1,276 HIV carriers were noted, their number increased by 728 in 1998. 
In 2000, 2,685 infected persons were identified in the region, with 45% of them in the 
development stage of the disease. Currently, there are officially 3,000 HIV carriers in 
the region and their number could be two times higher according to unofficial 
sources. Official statistics show that, in Kaliningrad region, infection rate per 100,000 
persons is the highest in whole Russia6. 
Low incomes of the population and poor financial state of the health care system help 
the spread of tuberculosis. Taking into account the number of residents, density of 
population and the spread of pulmonary tuberculosis, we should assume that 
residents of urban areas are most endangered. In 1999, more than 800 residents 
developed for the first time advanced tuberculosis. At the beginning of 2000, 4,000 
persons suffering from different forms of tuberculosis were receiving medical 
attention. 
Venereal diseases are another serious medical condition affecting Kaliningrad’s 
citizens. In 2000, there were 5,000 cases of syphilis noted in the region. An epidemic 
of syphilis has been developing in the region during whole of the 90s. Currently, 
syphilis morbidity rates are two times higher than in Russia as a whole. Analysis of 
                                                 
5 Fyedorov, G.M., Symayeva, I.N., Dyemograficheskyi krizis i yevo slyedstva dlya kaliningradskovo 
sotsyuma (Demographic Crisis and Its Consequences for Kaliningrad’s Population), in: Klimyesheva 
A.P. (ed.), Kaliningradskyi sotsyum v yevropeyskom kontekstye (Kaliningrad’s Population in the 
European Contex), Kaliningrad 2002, pp. 122 - 142. 
6 Galeotti, M., Kaliningrad at the Crossroads, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2002. 
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statistical data shows ineffectiveness of preliminary prophylactic procedures, 
conducted mainly among the male part of population, both in cities and rural areas.  
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2. Relations Between the European Union and the Russian 
Federation and the Issues of Kaliningrad Region  
 
 
 
2.1. Strategy of the European Union on Kaliningrad 
 
In the context of impending extension of the European Union, special importance is 
attached to the relations between Moscow and Brussels. Officially, both sides declare 
that they want to define and protect the status of Kaliningrad enclave in the vicinity of 
the European structure. The EU is willing to export stability and security to the region 
and simultaneously it wants to avoid importing crime, contraband and other negative 
social and economical phenomena. According to the EU, the enlargement of its 
structures should present for Kaliningrad an opportunity to revive its market and bring 
a solution to the problems experienced in the region. Economical growth, 
improvement of living standards and strengthening of the rule of law in the region 
should lead to a decrease of immigration pressure, crime and other negative 
phenomena that are feared in the EU. Transit and visas cannot be discussed 
separately from those issues.   
 
In the dispute about the future of Kaliningrad, which takes place between Russia, the 
EU, Lithuania and Poland, the EU aims to determine areas, which especially require 
close co-operation. These include such issues as:  maintenance of the free transit as 
part of a transport network with Russia, freedom of movement of persons, energy 
supplies, and fishery. Co-operation in the previously mentioned areas would help 
Kaliningrad to benefit from opportunities created by the extension of the EU and to 
deal with the challenges it currently faces. Nevertheless, European Union does not 
agree to grant the region any special status – whether it be membership, an 
economic union or a visa-free travel regime.  
 
The Russian Federal Government officially fulfils a foreign policy of entering into 
closer relation with the EU. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that 
Russia’s foreign policy is simultaneously subordinated to internal policy objectives, 
such as development of democracy and market economy that would efficiently serve 
current economical relations and improve living conditions of the society. Russia is 
not able to accomplish those goals unless it will integrate into a common global 
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economic space. This caused a pro-Western and pro-European shift in Russian 
policy, which includes acceptation and support for the process of EU enlargement by 
the Russian Federation.    
 
 
2.2. The Cooperation Council Between the EU and Russia, and The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
The European Union cooperates with Russia within the framework of The 
Cooperation Council between the EU and Russia, acting under the “1+15” formula.  
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994, which came into force 
on 1 December 1997, forms the basis of all joint actions. Activities affecting 
Kaliningrad are carried out by individual EU member states.  Among those most 
involved in help for the region are: Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The EU has 
sponsored numerous projects, mainly under TACIS programme, i.e. large projects 
targeted at the establishment of public institutions, energy sector, transport, 
reconstruction of the companies, trainings of the personnel and environmental 
protection.  Assistance under TACIS programme has been granted since 1991 and 
was intensified in 1994, when Kaliningrad was qualified as a priority region. In 2001 
new projects related to cross-border traffic, nuclear waste disposal, health services, 
support for small and medium companies sector and promotion of trade and 
investments in Kaliningrad were started. In the dispute about Kaliningrad, there 
emerge also proposals of converting the region into a centre of technical innovations’ 
development. Both present EU members and candidate countries actively participate 
in the activities for the region.  
 
The EU addresses following issues and proposals:  better management of cross-
border traffic at border crossings and acceleration of entrance procedures, 
establishment of a necessary transport strategy, selection of priority fields of the 
regional transport infrastructure that require extra financial assistance and 
modernization, determination of the feasibility of introducing EU regulations to 
regional border traffic, simplification of visa procedures and migrations movement 
management, determination of the feasibility of establishing consulates of EU 
member states in Kaliningrad, finalisation of the re-admission agreement, finding 
feasible scenarios of future energy supply for Kaliningrad, examination of possible 
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consequences of EU extension for access to fisheries and for a future  fisheries 
cooperation agreement between the Russia and the EU. The question of 
environmental protection in the region of Kaliningrad is also being discussed.  
 
 
2.3. The EU Common Strategy on Russia and the EU Northern 
Dimension 
The EU Common Strategy on Russia was agreed in June 1999. The Strategy 
combines priority goals in such areas as: consolidation of democracy, rule of law and 
public institutions; integration of Russia into a common European economic and 
social space; stability and security in Europe and beyond; common challenges to the 
European continent (including environmental issues, crime and illegal immigration).  
 
Russian Federation is one of the major targets of the EU Northern Dimension, which 
operates in the fields of foreign and cross-border policy of the EU7. In July 1999, 
Russia and Lithuania issued a joint proposal concerning the status of Kaliningrad in 
the light of the Northern Dimension, followed by a detailed proposal issued by Russia 
in October 1999. It is in this document that Kaliningrad region and its future role as a 
Russian enclave in the European Union were presented. The Northern Dimension 
initiative was subsequently included in the EU Common Strategy on Russia. 
 
 
 
2.4. Russia-EU summits 
Ten Russia-EU summits have been held within the framework of Russian-EU co-
operation.  Kaliningrad-related issues become more vivid around the year 2000 when 
two summits were held, first on 29 May in Moscow and then on 3 October in 
Brussels8.  Both sides became aware of the urgency of these issues and though they 
lacked any proposals of resolving the problem, Kaliningrad started to appear 
continuously in the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels.  
 
                                                 
7  The Northern Dimension covers the following geographical area: Baltic Sea region, Arctic Sea and 
North-West Russia. Countries situated within the scope of the Northern Dimension that are not 
members of the EU are: Estonia, Russia, Poland, Norway, and Iceland.  
8 Two summits take place each year, due to changing EU presidency. 
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In January 2001 European Commission issued the Communication “The European 
Union and Kaliningrad” which proposed solutions aiming to prevent further isolation 
of the region.   Among other issues, the document included an analysis of the 
situation of the enclave in the fields of economy, environmental protection, health, 
corruption levels, crime and contrasts between local law and regulations and law 
standards applied in the EU. It presented implications of EU enlargement for the 
region, such as: lower average duty charges on goods exported from Russia to new 
EU member states, lower costs of transit of Russian products through the territories 
of Latvia and Lithuania. Simultaneously, Brussels presented negative consequences 
of the process, mentioning introduction of visas, difficulties with energy supply for the 
enclave, Russian military transit through Lithuanian territory, and negative attitude 
present in a part of the Russian society towards eastward expansion of Western 
organisations.  
 
In 2001 two Russia-EU summits were held, on 17 May in Moscow and on 30 October 
in Brussels. Both sides decided that Kaliningrad’s development is primarily a 
responsibility of local and federal Russian authorities. The document issued at the 
summit in Brussels (30 October 2001) presented a more elaborate opinion about the 
issues of border protection. Both sides expressed their will to continue their dialogue 
aimed at achieving an agreement on the issues of consulates and visas, in the 
context of new countries being admitted to the EU and the Schengen Agreement. 
The document laid stress on the need to sign a readmission agreement. In the 
economic sphere, it focused on increasing the importance of a debate about the idea 
of Central European Economic Space (CEES), which would cover the area of Russia 
and the EU9. Furthermore, at the October 2001 summit they agreed to establish a 
common group gathering twice a year and working on the concept and schedule of a 
closer economic integration of the Russian Federation with European Union. 
Moreover, it is crucial to note that at the very same meeting Russia informed about 
forming its own working group on Kaliningrad-related issues. 
 
In April and May 2002, Russia demanded that exterritorial corridors be formed 
through the territories of Lithuania and Poland, which would allow transit of goods 
                                                 
9 The project of CEES emerged during the Moscow summit in May 2001, when an expert taskforce 
dealing with the project was established. 
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and passengers between Russia and Kaliningrad.  Vehicles and trains would pass 
those corridors without any supervision of Polish or Lithuanian authorities on 
condition that they would leave Poland and Lithuania in the period of twelve hours. 
The EU was unwilling to undermine any of the Schengen Agreement regulations and 
thus refused Russia’s demands.  
 
In 2002, both Russia-EU summits, on 29 May in Moscow and on 11 November in 
Brussels, were dominated by debates on Kaliningrad-related issues. The Moscow 
Summit in May did not bring any breakthroughs or constructive resolutions. Russia 
did not want to withdraw its demands, including the creation of two land corridors, 
through which Russian citizens could travel using their internal passports with a 
special 12-hour transit pass.  Russians would also be allowed to travel in Lithuania 
on their way to and from Kaliningrad in sealed buses and special trains. Moreover, 
simplified procedures would be used when issuing Lithuanian, Polish and “Schengen” 
visas.   
 
The EU, according to its previous statement, refused Russian demands and 
President Putin was told that Kaliningrad residents travelling to Russia by land, as 
well as Russians travelling to Kaliningrad would have to obtain “Schengen” visas.  
The EU presented following proposals: inexpensive and easily obtainable visas for 
the period preceding Polish and Lithuanian access to the Schengen Agreement 
(about 3-5 years); long-term and inexpensive frequent use visas; possibility of 
applying for a visa of new member states by mail, in travel companies or business 
chambers; benefits coming from multilateral agreements on the recognition of transit 
visas of Russian residents by Poland and three Baltic republics10 as well as other 
visa-related simplifications such as entitlement to travel in any of the new member 
states with a visa issued by a single EU member state; assistance in modernisation 
of the border crossings’ network; development of a network of consulates of EU 
member states accredited to Kaliningrad; economical assistance, grants for 
environmental protection activity,  campaigns against AIDS and other epidemic 
diseases; assistance in resolving the issue of energy transit. The EU reaffirmed the 
above-mentioned proposals of facilitations and assistance on 12 July 2002 in 
                                                 
10 This beneficial solution would mean that a Russian citizen with an Estonian visa, for instance, could 
freely travel through Poland.  
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Moscow in the form of a proposed partnership for Kaliningrad scheme. Nevertheless, 
both sides were far from reaching a compromise and a signed joint agreement only 
affirmed that they would continue to seek a resolution of the Kaliningrad issue, which 
would be satisfying for each side.  
 
On 18 September 2002, European Commission presented a document concerning 
the issue of transit to and/or from the region after the extension of the EU. It 
introduced new solutions such as: division of Russian passengers travelling in 
Lithuania to or from Kaliningrad into two groups: those who travel more and less 
frequently. The first group would be issued with the Facilitated Transit Document 
(FTD) that would entitle them to multiple entries in short time intervals and could be 
valid for a period of several months with the possibility of revalidation. FTD would be 
issued by Lithuanian consular offices free of charge or with a minimal fee on the 
basis of lists of travelling citizens provided by Russia. Consular offices would be 
entitled to refuse to issue such a document. Less often travelling people would have 
to apply for normal visas. Furthermore, the document proposed examining the 
feasibility of establishing a high-speed train connection between the enclave and 
mainland Russia, which would travel non-stop through the territory of Lithuania. The 
EC mentioned however that the conditions necessary for introducing such visa-free 
transit could not be met at the moment. Such solution would require the 
modernization of the railroad infrastructure and Lithuania would have to retain the 
right to exercise control over the trains or to refuse them to enter. Discussion on this 
subject is possible only after Poland and Lithuania finally join the EU. Brussels again 
refused the proposal of introducing visa-free travel by buses through the territory of 
Lithuania, because it would stand against legal regulations of the Schengen acquis 
and because of the lack of technical conditions. The EC addressed to Poland and 
Lithuania a confirmation that proposed solutions to the Kaliningrad transit issue would 
not affect their application for full membership in the Schengen acquis. Furthermore, 
the EU restated the need of signing readmission agreements, which Russia 
continued to refuse to sign.   
 
European Commission’s proposal was met with a cold reception of the Russian 
representation, which particularly criticised unclear division of Russian citizens after 
introduction of FTDs, which according to Russians are nothing else than surrogates 
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of visa documents. The European Commission mentioned in the text of the document 
from 18 September 2002 that the acquis is not inflexible and has nothing to say on 
the issue of transit of persons through EU territory from a third country to the same 
third country. Therefore the EC gave itself certain flexibility and offered to examine 
the feasibility of high-speed trains. It was also ready to continue debates on the 
introduction of a visa-free travel regime in the future.   
 
Russia opted for Lithuanian participation in the negotiations, since Lithuania is a 
country with direct interest in those issues. The initiative to include Lithuania in the 
negotiations came from Austria. The ministers of foreign affairs of Greece, Italy, 
Spain and France addressed in turn Lithuania, asking it to reconsider its decision 
against undertaking feasibility studies of a scheme of visa-free transit for Russian 
travelers.   
 
After the meeting of diplomatic representatives of the „Fifteen” in  September 2002, 
the European Commission and Denmark, who presided over the EU in the second 
half of the 2002, held a series of meetings with Lithuania and Russia on the future of 
Kaliningrad region. During 24 and 25 October 2002 an European Union summit was 
held in Brussels, which among other things reaffirmed the EU statement on 
negotiations with Moscow in relation to the issue of transit of Russian passengers 
from and to Kaliningrad through the territory of Lithuania. It included such solutions 
as: introduction of FTDs on July 1 2003, applicable to all types of direct transit of 
passengers between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia; internal Russian passports 
together with FTDs or other transit permits would be respected by Lithuanian border 
authorities in case of train transport until the end of 2004; the decision about studies 
which would be undertaken by independent experts in 2003 (to prepare a report into 
feasibility of introducing high-speed visa-free train travel between Kaliningrad and the 
mainland Russia through the territory of Lithuania in accordance with the Schengen 
Agreement) has to be agreed with Lithuania after necessary adjustments are made; 
Russia is to sign readmission agreements with candidate countries (particularly with 
Lithuania); the EU confirmed that the decision regarding high-speed train scheme is 
only possible after  Lithuania and Poland access  the acquis; moreover, the EU 
committed itself to assist Lithuania in fulfilling the conditions of full access to the 
Schengen acquis the soonest that it is possible. Lithuanian representation agreed 
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with this statement and furthermore asked that an approximate date of its access to 
the Schengen acquis before 2006 be determined, but the EU turned down this 
postulate. Furthermore Lithuania insisted that FTDs should be issued in all of EU 
member and candidate transit countries (including Poland). The EU’s statement, 
however, did not determine the precise route; mentioning only that it relates to all 
types of the direct transit. The EU position does not mention Poland in any way.  
 
Last Russia-EU summit held on 11 November 2002 in Brussels eventually led to a 
compromise. The conditions of transit of Kaliningrad region residents to Russia 
through the territory of Lithuania and other questions agreed during the summit are 
listed below:  
 
 
• From July 1 2003, Russian citizens willing to travel through the territory of 
Lithuania to and from the region would need both FTD and an internal 
passport. Such interim requirements would be in force till the end of 2004. 
From the beginning of 2005 transit through EU territory will require 
internationally recognizable passports (Lithuania is to introduce visas for 
Russian citizens since 1 January 2003, six months before introducing 
FTDs). 
 
• The FTD would be a multiple-entry document and shall be valid only in 
regard to direct transit via all forms of transport by land to and from 
Kaliningrad during the substantial period of time; it would be issued either 
free of charge or with a low fee, in Lithuanian consular offices. 
 
• Those Russian citizens intending to make single return trips by train 
through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, should apply for a 
Facilitated Rail Travel Document (FRTD), obtainable on the basis of 
personal data submitted at the time of ticket purchase. To obtain such a 
document, Russian citizens will have to apply for a permission of Lithuanian 
authorities. Applications could be made in travel offices and also directly at 
railway stations. Lithuanian authorities would be entitled to deny entrance to 
persons who apply for such document. Passengers who obtain FRTD 
would not be allowed to step out of the train in Lithuania and the duration of 
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each transit would be limited in time (the time limits have not been yet 
determined). 
 
• The EU promised financial assistance in the implementation of the         
facilitated transit scheme and the issuance of facilitated travel documents. 
 
• Visas for Russian citizens shall also be introduced by the rest of candidates 
(from 1 July 2003 in the case of Poland). 
 
• Russian proposal for visa-free transit by high-speed trains through the 
territory of Lithuania is postponed, since at the present moment it is 
impossible to implement. Decisions on that issue will be taken after 
Lithuania’s accession to the European Union. 
 
• A decision to launch a feasibility study in 2003 by independent consultants 
will be made in agreement with Lithuania. 
 
• Russia confirmed its intention to sign a readmission agreement with 
Lithuania and obliged itself to do this not later than 30 June 2003 (FTD will 
come into force on 1 July 2003). 
 
 
It is worth noting that practically all initiatives of specific compromise solutions, which  
arose during dialogue on the Kaliningrad-related issues, were proposed by the EU. 
Long awaited compromise made at the summit in Brussels was welcomed by EU and 
especially by Denmark, EU presidential country. The EU proved its flexibility when it 
agreed on the conditions of issuance of FTDs and FRTDs to Russian citizens. It did 
not give in regarding the question of high-speed visa-free travel scheme and 
considers it presently impossible to implement.  
 
Russia is also satisfied with final results of negotiations, although President Putin 
noted publicly that these are not optimal solutions.  Regarding the issue of visa-free 
high-speed trains, Russia received a promise that in year 2003 an independent team 
would start to work on their design (previously mentioned feasibility study). High-
speed trains could serve for visa-free transit through the territory of Lithuania.  Still a 
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final decision on that issue is to be taken only after Lithuanian accession to the EU 
and would require univocal agreement of EU member states (if the negotiations are 
unsuccessful or their results are not beneficial for Lithuania, there exists a threat of 
Lithuania blocking this decision, to which it has sovereign right). However, it was 
underlined that visa-free transit must be preceded by systematic cooperation in the 
area of immigration policy, which includes Russian commitment to finalise the 
readmission agreement  soon.  
 
 
2.5. Polish strategy towards Kaliningrad region  
Russia issued demands for visa-free transit of passengers also in Poland. The 
situation became particularly tense at the turn of April and May 2002 and later at the 
Russia-EU summit on 29 May 2002. Since these demands were stated in terms of 
“extraterritorial corridors”, Poland, which is prejudiced to such rhetoric, strictly denied 
Russian postulates. This was met with full support from the EU. In July 2002, Poland 
was excluded from the dispute on transit transfers and Russia officially stated that 
Poland is no longer considered a transit country.  Polish authorities shall introduce 
visas for Russian citizens on 1 July 2003.   
 
However, that was not the end of Polish involvement in the issues of the Kaliningrad 
Region. Strategy towards Kaliningrad forms an integral part of Polish foreign policy 
and Polish-Russian relations.  Poland wants to keep good neighbourly relations with 
the Russian Federation and Polish authorities see eastward expansion of the EU as 
an opportunity rather than a threat to the region. Poland is satisfied with the solutions 
developed during the EU-Russia summit on 11 November 2002. It is ready for a 
multi-levelled cross-border and interregional cooperation with the region and willing to 
actively participate in EU programmes aimed at eliminating the sense of isolation and 
raise the standards of living of residents of the enclave.  Poland supports and takes 
part in cooperation between border guards, local administration and business 
environments. 
Still, the debate about future of the Kaliningrad region lacks one important 
component: visible cooperation between Poland and  Lithuania. After EU Eastern 
enlargement, the Kaliningrad issue will concern at most its immediate neighbours, 
Poland and Lithuania, and other EU countries only to a lesser extent. It seems that 
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Poland excluded itself from talks on this issue too early. Lithuania also did not receive 
sufficient support and was forced to make many concessions concerning solutions 
for the region, receiving in return a promise from the EU that it will find itself among 
the first group of candidate countries, which will be fully accepted to the Schengen 
acquis. Therefore Poland, together with other new EU member countries, will be 
forced to wait for Lithuania’s readiness. Delayed introduction of Lithuania into the 
Schengen acquis will also affect Poland. In this context, it seems worthwhile to 
tighten relations and widen areas of cooperation with Vilnus.  
 
 
2.6. Lithuanian strategy towards the Kaliningrad region 
Lithuania regards co-operation with the Kaliningrad region as a basis of sustainable 
development of both bilateral Lithuanian-Russian relations and relations with the rest 
of the Baltic region. Lithuania pays special attention to mutual cooperation in the area 
of energy, transport and other economic sectors, as well as to expansion of cultural 
exchange, dialogue and interpersonal relations. It also insists on establishing a 
partnership between Russian Federation and European Union in the context of its 
future membership in the European structure. Lithuanian government’s guidelines for 
the future relations with Kaliningrad include: development of cross-border and 
interregional relations through activity of Euroregions, preparation for the 
implementation of joint cross-border projects funded by the EU support programmes, 
implementation of concrete environmental protection schemes, joint actions against 
organised crime and improvement of border protection.  
Lithuania considers the joint agreement reached in the course of negotiations 
between Russia and the EU a result of a search for political compromises and a 
starting point to achieve a solution that would suit Lithuania best. Its participation in 
the implementation of the November agreement will depend on European guarantees 
regarding Lithuanian access to Schengen zone (Lithuania expects guarantees of 
being among the first countries to join Schengen agreement) and additional financial 
support. Lithuania stated that any further decisions will furthermore depend on 
Russian willingness to cooperate, particularly in relation to the agreement on state 
borders, readmission agreement, development of a network of Lithuanian consulates 
in Russia, regulations regarding the transfer of Lithuanian passengers in Russia and 
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other issues substantial to both sides. Still, critical voices can also be heard and 
Lithuanian political opposition deems the agreements humiliating.  
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3. Kaliningrad Region from Russian Perspective – Three 
Points of View 
 
 
3.1. Central government 
The way the authorities in Moscow approach the issue of Kaliningrad region and in 
particular the approach of President’s administration can be interpreted in terms of a 
symbolic conflict. Arguments used by the President and his representatives relate to 
fundamental principles, with which it is virtually impossible to discuss. They speak of 
the national pride, issues of human rights and attempts of infringement upon Russian 
national integrity. President Putin’s statements, such as: “We will never agree (…) to 
destroy sovereign Russian territory” issued during the EU summit in Seville in June 
2002, fully express argumentative character of the approach that Russia has chosen 
to present in the negotiation process. However, President’s co-workers from the 
lower levels of administration issue statements, which show a realistic understanding 
of the Kaliningrad issue. At the meeting with the representatives of the European 
Commission and the representatives of Polish and Lithuanian governments in March 
2002, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Ivan Ivanov defined 
four areas of problems, which have to be resolved: transport of passengers and 
transit of goods between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia, problems with energy 
supply in light of adapting Lithuanian energy transfer scheme to European standards, 
and fishery quotas which have to be renegotiated and adapted in order to adhere to 
European regulations.  Although he presented concrete issues, which need to be 
resolved, Russian proposals omit the priority issue of an organism existing within the 
integrated EU territory, which differs significantly in economical and political aspects 
from bordering countries. Russia and the EU have to ask themselves an essential 
question whether the region is going to be integrated with the EU or remain isolated.   
 
Introduction of visas for Russian citizens is a major subject in the dispute about 
consequences of the EU extension. According to Russian authorities, it would limit 
Russian residents’ freedom of movement within the Russian Federation, which is 
guaranteed by international law and is therefore a violation of human rights. 
Introduction of visas is the most spectacular act of the EU extension and the part of 
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negotiations which attracted strongest attention. Other issues seem not to exist in the 
official statements.  
 
 
 
3.2. Local government  
Local authorities wait for a signal to act, in the meantime issuing official statements 
that conform to the policy of the government in Moscow.  Nevertheless, central 
government ignores local authorities in talks with the EU. Deputies from the regional 
Duma (local parliament) agree to all proposals issued by the President and treat 
present situation as an opportunity for the region. They seek to take advantage of 
President Putin’s proposal to make Kaliningrad a gateway between Russia and 
Europe.  According to plans, this could be achieved through implementation of the 
Federal Kaliningrad Region Development Programme Till 2010, which includes co-
operation with EU structures. The programme, based on a project of German Gref, 
the Minister of Trade and Economical Development, and Vladimir Yegorov, the 
governor of the Kaliningrad region, was endorsed in October 2001 by the 
government of the Russian Federation. Its objective is to level large differences in the 
rate of social-economical development between the district and neighbouring 
countries and to equalise the prevailing standards in the region. For that purpose, 
transport infrastructure is to be developed, i.e. existing road connections and sea 
harbours will be modernised and new ones will be built, together with a new thermo-
power plant. Kremlin intends to turn the enclave into an important transit point in that 
part of Europe and at the same time wants it to be independent from energy supplied 
through the territory of Lithuania. It is worth to take a note that the programme does 
not plan any investments in the production sector, although one of its main postulates 
is a shift from import to production and export economy (in practice, this would be 
achieved through investors, mainly foreign ones, manufacturing in the district high 
quality products at reasonably low prices, in order to sell them to Western European 
countries). 
 
Deputies of the Kaliningrad’s Duma do not see the possibility of resolving EU 
enlargement-related issues at the local level. In their opinion, all such issues should 
be solved through a special agreement between the EU and Russian central 
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government. They assume that such agreement would allow adaptation of region’s 
legislature, including production regulations, to EU law standards. 
 
They consider the extension of the EU an opportunity.  Still, they are aware of the 
lack of a formal framework for their actions. Among positive future consequences 
they mention adaptation of the market so that it would comply with European 
standards, development in the areas of environmental protection and medicine and 
an increase in educational possibilities. They underline that their region has best 
ability of adjusting to EU standards, since it is nearest geographically and has good 
relations with neighbouring countries.  They issue proposals for the establishment of 
an EU accredited representative in Kaliningrad as well as agencies responsible for 
EU information policy.  They are conscious of the fact that negative attitude towards 
EU extension is related to increasing negative opinions about the EU, which are 
mostly related to the planned introduction of visas. The agencies would take care of 
wide distribution of information about the EU, so that it would no longer be perceived 
only in the light of visa-related complications.  
 
Deputies of the local parliament are convinced that some measures should be 
undertaken to increase living standards of region residents’, since a large group 
among them lives from cross-border trade. They pointed to the fact that reduction of 
cross-border relations would adversely affect economically not only the residents of 
the district, but also a significant number of Polish and Lithuanian citizens living near 
the border.  
 
It is also worth mentioning specific Russian views on the process of European 
integration and issues relevant to the Schengen acquis. Still alive is an opinion that 
Schengen rules were created without taking into consideration the fall of the USSR. A 
popular belief states that while EU cannot develop without maintaining good relations 
with Russia, she herself can prosper without cooperation with the EU. Though on the 
level of local authorities the problem of visas is approached in a pragmatic manner, 
even there a rhetoric, which sees visas as a limitation of human rights, is sometimes 
used.  
 
Such radical attitudes can also be found among employees of region’s 
administration. The EU statement on the transit of persons and goods are seen as a 
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dictate, through which a foreign country tries to decide about issuance of visas to 
Russian citizens travelling within the area of their own country. Again, they neglect 
the right of other countries to take sovereign decisions and exercise control over their 
territories. Visas may become obstacles to the cooperation with foreign partners on 
the field of cultural and educational activity. Still it is understood that they will also 
decrease in the length of queues and amount of contraband on the borders. 
 
Regional administration is also aware of concrete issues, which may emerge after the 
EU extension.  The EU standards will hurt the Russian-manufactured aeroplanes, 
since airplanes manufactured in Russia may be turned away from Lithuanian air zone 
because of their incompatibility with environmental standards. Facing this challenge, 
the Ministry of Transport and civil aircraft carriers have already started adapting their 
planes to the requirements.  Railroad traffic is another live issue, for necessary 
adjustments, which have to be made in Lithuania to fit standards of the EU, requires 
overcoming both technical (Lithuanian rail tracks will have to be standardised) and 
legal obstacles and will thus pose another challenge for transportation of persons and 
goods.  
 
Supply of energy to the region is another vital issue. At the present moment, 90% of 
basic energy supplies is transferred though the territory of Lithuania. Fears of a 
dramatic increase in energy prises after EU enlargement begins to surface. There 
are plans to build a power plant in the region capable of securing 50% of basic 
energy needs. The Byelorussian company had won the tender for the construction of 
an electric plant and according to latest information has already started the 
construction works. Another proposal was made by the Russian GAZPROM 
company, which includes construction of a gas pipeline running on the Baltic Sea 
floor from Russia to Northern Germany. An arm of the pipeline would be used to 
send gas to the region without transit through foreign territory.  
 
Local authorities also mentioned the issues connected with transit of passengers and 
goods through the territory of Lithuania, with securing provision of energy supplies 
and basic energy sources (gas), management of the border infrastructure and 
residents’ visits to neighbouring countries and Russia. They also use stronger 
arguments: even now we can anticipate increase of death rate among children and 
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people in the productive age, who do not have passports and cannot afford airplane 
tickets, whereas specialised medical centres are situated outside the region. 
Problems also emerge with the transport of mentally ill and criminals who serve their 
sentences in prisons in the region, to the regions where they permanently reside. 
 
Although local leaders do not want to infringe upon competences of central 
authorities, they can present recommendations and detailed solutions of issues that 
may emerge after the extension of EU and implementation of Schengen Agreement 
to the territories of Poland and Lithuania. They speak about the consequences of the 
extension in terms of specific problems, which have to be resolved. Thus, their 
approach towards the process of European integration is pragmatic rather than 
ideological. This should not be any wonder, since as residents of Kaliningrad they do 
not treat the region instrumentally. It is not surprising either that their arguments are 
more emotional, for instance they fear isolation from mainland Russia and increased 
foreign influence in the region. In a country as centralised as Russia, where the 
authorities put great attention to territorial integrity, any attempts to express own 
opinion would be considered a kind of separatism. All solutions must thus be agreed 
at the central level. Therefore the debate about consequences of EU extension is 
dominated by the standpoint of federal authorities.  
 
A conflict exists between local and presidential administration. Its most spectacular 
symptom was the resignation of Valery Stiugov, a member of the Russian Federation 
Council and a former president of Kaliningrad’s region parliament. Stiugov resigned 
in protest against the appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as President’s special envoy for 
Kaliningrad, who according to Stiugov is an aggressive and anti-Western politician, 
not suitable for the role of the negotiator, ignoring all suggestions coming from local 
authorities and who sees negotiations with European Union only in terms of symbolic 
conflict. 
 
 
3.3. Local entrepreneurs 
In accordance with the regulation of the Ministry Council of the RF, which was 
subsequently reaffirmed by President’s decree, in 1991 Kaliningrad was given special 
economic status in the Russian Federation. A Free Trade Zone (Jantar) was 
established with the goal of reducing high costs of transit of goods imported from 
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mainland Russia or foreign countries. Special status of the region was eventually 
regulated in 1996 by a federal act on the Special Economic Zone (SEZ). SEZ 
functions on the basis of duty, VAT and excise tax immunities for goods imported to 
the region or manufactured within the Zone and transported to remaining tax territory 
of the Russian Federation.  Immunities are granted on condition that an increase in 
goods’ value through manufacture or other enhancement (not less than 30% or 15% 
depending on the category of the product) is high enough to consider the product 
“made in Kaliningrad”. The regulations did not provide any further tax reductions 
other than those in force in the whole of Russian Federation. The immunities were 
aimed at compensating losses suffered by the region due to its geographical situation 
and isolation form mainland Russia, which made it necessary to organise costly 
transit of goods through the territory of another country. Through them, Kaliningrad 
products became competitive on the Russian market due to their lower prices. Still, 
Kaliningrad products do not have any better chances of competing on the EU retail 
market.  Local businessmen are aware that they will not enter the EU market, since 
they are unable to compete with Western companies. 
 
Duty free zone provides an opportunity to transfer goods from surrounding countries 
to Russia without paying the usual duty tax. It nurtures the development of an 
unofficial economy and illegal trade. Kaliningrad’s residents also use large 
discrepancies between prices of excise products in the region and neighbouring 
countries, especially in Poland. Half of the alcohol, which is manufactured in the 
region, is subsequently smuggled by so-called ‘ants’. Eighty percent of food imported 
into the district comes from small individual trade11. Introduction of more stricter and 
more thorough control at the borders may destabilise this unofficial economy.  
 
It is interesting to consider in this context negotiation proposals presented to the 
authorities by representatives of the Kaliningrad Chamber of Commerce. They speak 
of introducing transit of persons and products in sealed trains, buses and trucks, 
which would not be subjected to border controls. This could save a significant part of 
enterprises which function within the framework of unofficial economy12. Introduction 
                                                 
 11Smorodinskaja, N., Bałtycki szkopuł (The Baltic Difficulty), quoted after: Obwód kaliningradzki – 
Przegląd Faktów, Wydarzeń, Opinii (Kaliningrad District – Review of Facts, Events and Opinions) No. 
6/7, 2002, Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. W. Kętrzyńskiego, Olsztyn, pp. 30-31. 
12Ibid. 
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of visas and effective border checks would only slightly increase the costs of 
conducting legal trade.  
 
Representatives of local business are convinced that the EU extension would mostly 
undermine small and medium companies. It would not weaken major companies, 
since in their case the issue of introducing visas or of introducing different means of 
transport would be barely important from the economic point of view. Entrepreneurs 
express their concern about introduction of EU standards in the surrounding 
countries, which according to them would lead to a displacement of products from 
Kaliningrad region on respective retail markets. Numerous petitions, filed before 
federal institutions, complain about the lack of devotion and tardiness in relation to 
the issue of adjusting Russian standards to the ones in force in the EU. Their 
concerns also relate to a possible increase in the prices of energy, other goods 
imported from neighbouring countries and finally the costs of transport through 
territory of other countries -- new members of the EU.  This would decrease the 
buying power of Kaliningrad residents. According to a member of the Russian 
Federation Council, Nikolay Tulayev, a widespread introduction of Schengen 
regulations to the territories of Poland and Lithuania would lead to a doubling of 
prices and a decrease of local economic growth by one third in the region13.  
 
Businessmen repeatedly ask about the consequences of EU enlargement and in 
particular of the extension of Schengen acquis for regions, where cross-border trade 
remains the main source of income. Although they usually point to problems that may 
occur in neighbouring countries, this is of course dictated not just by their care about 
the well being of Poles or Lithuanians, who live near the border. This might just prove 
the importance of cross-border trade for the Kaliningrad region. 
 
We have to pay attention to one more aspect of the introduction of visas. One of the 
priority sectors of the Kaliningrad region’s economy is tourist industry. Eighty percent 
of the 200 thousand of Russian tourists who mainly visit health resorts financed by 
Russian social security arrive to the region by trains. Visa requirements would be for 
them a serious obstacle and would further deprive the region of its main 
characteristic feature, as today region’s promotional slogan says “Kaliningrad is a 
                                                 
13 ibid. 
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gateway to Europe”.  Holiday offers include short-term visits to Poland, in particular to 
Sopot and Mikołajki. Businessmen from the tourist industry fear that introduction of 
visas would cause a significant decrease in tourist traffic.   
 
Generally speaking, we may observe that businessmen see the issue of EU 
enlargement not only through a prism of visa requirements. Their approach is more 
pragmatic than that of central authorities. The proposal of establishing an EU 
standards information centre, which they made, would be best fulfilled with the use of 
funds from the TACIS assistance programme. Thus they not only have postulates, 
but also know how these can be accomplished, leading to harmonization of product 
standards for goods targeted both at the EU market and mainland Russia.  
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4. Findings of the Survey Research  
 
 
 
In this part we would like to present findings of the survey ordered by IPA and carried 
out by GfK Russia in the Kaliningrad region during the period from August to October 
2002 on a sample of 1004 adult citizens. 
 
 
 
4.1. Mobility of Kaliningrad region residents 
Kaliningrad region is inhabited by approximately 950,000 of people. One of region’s 
characteristics is a population consisting mainly of immigrants, as only four out of 
every ten residents were born in the region. Every third resident was born in other 
parts of Russia and almost one-fifth of the population comes from countries 
associated in the Commonwealth of Independent States, other than  Russia. 
 
 
Graph 1. Respondent's place of birth
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Source: IPA data. 
 
 
We may assume that such characteristics of the region will lead to high mobility of its 
population, with Kaliningrad residents frequently leaving the enclave. According to 
respondents’ statements, during the preceding twelve-month period 250,000 
persons, or one-fourth of the whole population, visited other regions of mainland 
Russia. Most often, they would frequently mention meeting the family as the aim of 
their visits, which is not very surprising, regarding the fact that every third resident of 
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the enclave was born in mainland Russia, outside the region. Also among those who 
were born in the region, there are many persons who have relatives in other parts of 
Russia. The second most frequently mentioned reason was business trips, which 
appeared three times less often.  The largest group among those who travel to 
mainland Russia were respondents between 27-47 years old, who constituted a 
quarter of those travelling. The number of older travellers was significantly smaller 
(less than 10%).  
 
Research ordered by President’s special envoy and carried out in June 2002 
provides us also with unexpected results14. Frequency of visits to other regions of 
Russia declared by respondents is completely different, with the percentage of 
respondents who leave the region several times a year equal to only 3%, when 
according to our research they number 24%. What could cause such a great 
difference? It was probably related to a media campaign, which has been led since 
the EU-Russia summit on 29 May 2002, when the government launched preparations 
for the Copenhagen summit, which was to be held in November 2002. According to 
the Russian research findings, an increase of interest in the issue of visas occurred 
in this period. Asked the question, “Did you hear about discrepancies between 
Russia’s and EU position concerning introduction of visas for Russian citizens 
travelling on land between mainland Russia and the region?” 52% of the respondents 
responded affirmatively in June 2002 and their number increased up to 65% in 
September. At the time when the IPA research took place, i.e. the period between 
the last days of August and the beginning of September 2002, approximately 90% of 
the respondents knew about the introduction of visa requirements by Poland and 
Lithuania. It seemed to be really important for the respondents to manifest their belief 
that the introduction of visas would actually limit their freedom of travel, though it 
would be very hard to verify such hypothesis. However, if the data of the Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is true and 90% of the cross-border traffic consists of 
residents of the frontier areas, the actual number of visits to mainland Russia might 
be lower than that declared by respondents.   
 
                                                 
14 Kaliningradskaya problyema v zyerkale obshchestvyennovo mnyenya, Isledovatelskaya gruppa 
CYRKON and Kaliningradskyi sotsyologycheskyi tsyentr, Moscow, October 2002. 
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Graph 2. Reasons for leaving Kaliningrad region and visiting  
mainland Russia 
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Source: IPA data. Percents do not add up to 100, since respondents could mention up to three 
countries. 
 
 
Majority of those who use to travel stated that they visit other regions of Russia 
several times a year using the cheapest means of transport, which require transit 
through the territory of other countries. Among persons who travel by land, great 
majority (92%) responded that on their way to Russia they cross in transit the territory 
of Lithuania15. Approximately 80% of the travellers, who do not have any passports, 
travel to Russia by train. As far as airplane or ferry connections are concerned, 
respectively only 8 and 1% of travellers mentioned those means of transport, which 
do not require transit through other countries. After the introduction of visa 
requirements, all other passengers will have to obtain their passports, since from the 
beginning of 2005 transit through EU territory would require them to have 
international passports. The second necessary document would be a visa.  Lithuania 
is about to introduce visas on 1 January 2003, six months before the implementation 
of the Facilitated Travel Documents (FTD) scheme. Persons who will not fulfil those 
conditions will only be allowed to leave the region by air or sea. This would involve 
extra expenses, whereas average monthly family income, according to the 
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respondents, is lower than 100 euros and in one-third of the households oscillates 
between 100-200 euro. Only 16% of the respondents declared that their family 
income is higher than 200 euros. Information about the economical situation of 
region’s residents can also be found in the Russian research. The largest group of 
about 50% of the respondents, asked about what they fear the most in terms of 
future events, mentioned, in order: increase in the prices of basic products, increase 
of the costs of communal services and, low income. This proves that in general 
respondents are concerned about their economical situation, the more so that 
according to the Russian research data, approximately 60% of the respondents find it 
difficult to satisfy even such fundamental needs as purchase of food or clothing16.  
 
During the last 12 months, an estimated number of 100,000 residents of the enclave 
who do not own passport documents visited mainland Russia, including 86,000 
passengers, who have been travelling by train.  Approximately 24,000 of these ‘‘non-
passport passengers” travelled by land in private cars or by bus. Residents of the 
region (and they are the only ones) are still entitled to travel through the territory of 
Lithuania without such a document. They constitute a group, which would be the 
most vulnerable in face of negative consequences of the Schengen Agreement. 
Estimated number of passengers, who have been travelling by air to mainland Russia 
during the mentioned period is equal to about 20,000. Majority of those visits were 
official trips, which did not injure family budgets.  
 
Therefore, the issue of the introduction of visa requirement at the borders is not only 
a technical obstacle or a question of limiting the freedom of movement.  Actually, it 
has a bearing on personal expenses. For most of the residents of the Kaliningrad 
region, visa and passport charges or even the necessity of choosing more expensive 
means of transport would constitute a great burden for their family budgets.  
 
If we exclude transit passengers, half of the respondents declared that they visited 
countries other than the Russian Federation during the last decade. 31% of 
respondents declared that they travelled abroad during the 24-month period 
preceding the research. This gives an estimated number of 300,000 residents of the 
region who have visited foreign countries at least once during the last two years. 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Respondents could mention more than one country. 
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Among most often visited countries are other countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States; they were mentioned by four out of every ten respondents.  
Graph 3: Travels abroad in the last 24 months
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Source: IPA data. Percents do not add up to 100, since respondents could mention up to three 
countries. 
 
 
We can make a rough calculation that approximately 87,000 of non-transit 
passengers have visited Poland and approximately 100,000 have travelled to 
Lithuania.  It is interesting to note that a large percentage of respondents have visited 
Western Europe, including Germany; their number equals one-fourth of all travelling 
respondents.  Thus, we can assume that a large number of those travelling abroad 
have already went through visa procedures, either when obtaining a visa for a 
particular Western country or a Schengen visa.   
 
 Among those, who transited to Russia across the territory of other countries, 15% of 
respondents declared that they travelled through Poland. We can therefore assume 
that 34,000 of passengers from Kaliningrad passes through the territory of Poland 
each year. This confirms the position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
which stated that Poland is not a transit country. According to MFA data, 950,000 
Russian citizens crossed Polish-Russian border in 2001 and only 10,000 of those, or 
about 1%, were transit passengers to mainland Russia. 90% of all borer crossings 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 Kaliningradskaya problyema... op.cit.  
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result in visits were made for economical reasons. Usually these are short and 
multiple visits made by the same group of visitors17. Difference between the results 
obtained by IPA and MFA is equal to two statistical points and thus not very 
significant. Still, we must remember that MFA research provides only estimate, and 
not exact measures of transit traffic.  
 
Graph 4 Reasons for travelling abroad in the last 24 months 
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Source: IPA data. Percents do not add up to 100, since respondents could mention up to three 
countries. 
 
 
Even now, a large number of respondents (45%) travel to visit their relatives.  They 
would most frequently travel to countries, which belonged to the USSR until 1990.  
Approximately 25% of respondents declared that they travel for tourist reasons. 
However, it is difficult to calculate the exact number of those travelling, who are 
involved in small cross-border trade. Only 1% of respondents openly declared that 
cross-border trade is their main or supplementary source of income. This would 
mean that approximately 9,000-10,000 residents of the Kaliningrad region benefit 
from differences in prices of products between Kaliningrad and surrounding 
countries, earning their living this way. Asked about the reasons of their travels, 5% 
                                                 
17 Raport Departamentu Europy MSZ: Stanowiska ws. Ruchu osobowego i tranzytu osobowego z i do 
obwodu kaliningradzkiego FR (Report of the Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Position on Individual Ttravel and Transit to and from Kaliningrad Rgion of the Russian Federation). 
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of the respondents mentioned small trade. They constitute 1.5% of all respondents, 
slightly more than results of the question about source of income suggest. Certainly, 
part of the respondents, such as housewives or non-working retired persons, did not 
declare involvement in small trade and answered that they visited abroad for official 
reasons. 
 
 
4.2 Economical consequences of the EU enlargement 
When we asked the residents of Kaliningrad region about their attitude towards the 
EU extension in the context of the future changes of the economic situation, their 
opinions were mixed, with majority remaining pessimistic. Every four out of ten 
residents believe that economic situation in the region will get worse. The number of 
optimistic answers was twice smaller. 
 
 
Table 1. Influence of the accession of Poland and Lithuania to the EU on the 
economical situation of the Kaliningrad region 
 
What will be the influence upon the economical 
situation of Poland’s and Lithuania’s accession to the 
EU?  
Percentage of  respondents 
It will improve economical situation in the region 
 
19 
It will have no influence upon the economical 
situation of the region  
14 
It will worsen economical situation of the region 
 
40 
It is difficult to say 
 
27 
 
Source: IPA data. 
 
 
In none of the age groups can be observed a predominance of optimists. Pessimistic 
attitudes are strongest among the oldest group of respondents. Among those who 
are over 57 years old, only 14% of respondents believe that economical situation 
would improve after the enlargement of the European Union. Elder people share 
traditional negative views on those changes. Young people, 16- 26 years old, who 
are studying or starting their professional careers, seem to be more optimistic -- 
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every fourth of them believes that the situation will improve. The percentage of 
pessimists is similar in all age groups. Among oldest respondents, the largest 
percentage,  35% of them, had difficulty with answering this question.  
 
 
Table 2. Influence of Poland and Lithuania’s accession to the EU on the economical 
situation of the Kaliningrad region. Answers according to age division  
(percentage of respondents) 
 
                         Age (in 10-year intervals) 
What will be the influence 
upon the economical 
situation of Poland’s and 
Lithuania’s accession to 
the EU? (%) 
     16-26      27-36     37-46      46-56  57-and over 
It will improve economical 
situation of the region 
 
     24       20       18         23        14 
It will have no influence 
upon the economical 
situation of the region 
     15      18      14         12        10 
It will worsen economical 
situation of the region 
     38      37      44         42        41 
It is difficult to say 
 
      23      25      24         23        35 
 
Source: IPA data. 
 
 
There are no significant differences in respondents’ views on economical 
consequences of EU extension for the region in relation to their occupation or the 
level of family income.  Among the richest group, fewest number of respondents 
could not answer the question, but the group still did not express stronger optimism 
than other groups.  
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4.3. Introduction of visas  
(When the survey was conducted the FTD and FRTD has not been suggested yet. Due to it 
respondents was asked about introduction of visas). 
 
As we previously mentioned, central authorities treat EU enlargement in terms of 
basic principles and deem it as a violation of the right of Russian citizens to free 
movement within the boundaries of their own country. It is worthwhile to examine the 
level of knowledge about the introduction of visas among the society. 
 
Knowledge about introduction of visas in Poland and Lithuania is widespread, with 
90% of our respondents being aware of this fact. Vast majority of the respondents 
believe that visas will make it more difficult for them to transfer to other parts of 
Russia as well as to other countries. They are convinced that it will impair financial 
situation of their families. This seems quite obvious and is not only tied to the issue of 
small cross-border trade. Only 6% of the respondents who travel abroad admitted 
that they do it for economical reasons, i.e. to look for a job or take part in minor 
cross-border trade.  
 
The residents of the enclave will not only have to pay visa costs but furthermore 
cover expenses of travelling by a more expensive means of transport (by air or by 
ferry transport, with the later still under construction, as has already been mentioned 
in our report) when visiting other parts of Russia. We have to mention that the basic 
salary of 60% of the respondents is financed with money from the national budget. 
Among them are retired people, pensioners, professional soldiers, employees of 
state-owned companies and employees of the public sector. This means that their 
incomes are relatively low and are furthermore centrally regulated by authorities. In 
the group of people who receive salaries from the national budget, 65% of 
respondents declared that their family income is lower than 200 euro per month. 
Incomes of persons who manage their own business, including farmers18, are 
similarly low. After Poland and Lithuania join the EU, the costs of transit through 
these countries will increase. This most probably will lead to a general price increase 
                                                 
18 17% of respondents refused to answer the question about family incomes and it is probable that 
their incomes are higher than the average. Kaliningrad region was in 2001 the second poorest among 
the 10 members of the northwest part of the Russian Federation, measured by gross regional product 
per head. This index equals in the district USD 4,900 and is thus smaller by a thousand dollars than 
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in the district, mentioned in interviews by local businessmen. At the same time 
incomes of people paid from state budget will remain at the same level.  This will 
cause living conditions to deteriorate and will limit funds for eventual travels.  
 
 
Table 3. The influence of the introduction of visas in Poland and Lithuania 
(percentage of respondents) 
 
 For people 
like me, 
travelling to 
other parts 
of Russia 
will become 
more difficult 
For people like 
me, it will be 
more difficult to 
travel abroad  
 
Financial 
situation of 
my family will 
deteriorate 
 
Waiting time 
and the queues 
at the borders 
will be 
significantly 
shorter 
 
Corruption 
of border 
officials will 
decrease  
International 
crime will 
decrease  
I agree 
 
     70        63       46        36      19       21 
I don’t agree 
 
     15        19       25        42      57       57 
It is hard to 
tell 
 
     15        18      29        22      24       22 
 
Source: IPA data. 
 
 
Asked about the influence of the introduction of visas on the waiting time at the 
border, 42% anticipate that the queues will be shorter, 36% believe that the situation 
will improve and only few believe that the introduction of visas will lead to a decrease 
in the corruption at the borders or that it will limit the level of international crime.   
 
It is interesting to note that the distribution of opinions about visas, measured in 
percent, is similar among respondents who travelled to other parts of Russia during 
the preceding 12 months and those who did not leave the region. 35% of those who 
did not leave the district and 40% of those who left the region several times a year 
agreed that the waiting time at the border would be shorter. Among those who did not 
agree with this statement were, respectively, 42 and 45% of the respondents.  65% 
of respondents who did not leave the district and 62% of those who travelled to other 
parts of Russia agreed that for people like them it would be more difficult to travel to 
other parts of Russia. Respectively 17 and 21%t of the respondents shared the 
opposite opinion. In case of other questions about the consequences of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the average GDP in the Russian Federation and three times smaller than the size of Polish GDP.  
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introduction of visas, this relation was similar.   
 
Different views about consequences of introducing visas appear equally often among 
both those who travelled to other parts of Russia during the preceding 12 months and 
those who did not. Approximately 45% of respondents from the first group and 41 
from the second one do not see any chances of improving the situation at the border 
crossings, in terms of reducing the queues there.  Still, in both groups a relatively 
large number, approximately four of each ten respondents, share optimistic views 
about the expected reduction of waiting time at the borders.  
 
Far smaller is the number of optimistic responses to the question about expected 
decrease in corruption at the borders. Only 21% of those who left the region and 20% 
of those who did not, expect that the situation will improve.  Small differences are 
visible between the percentages of answers concerning the question about possible 
obstacles to travelling to Russia. As much as 71% of the respondents who did not 
leave Russia, compared to two-thirds of those who did travel abroad, fear new 
difficulties. It is interesting to note that those who did not leave RF during the 
preceding 24 months more often feared future difficulties in travelling to Russia. In 
both groups the percentage of those considering visas as obstacle to travels is high, 
with 71% of those who did not leave the country and 62% of those who did believing 
so. Among those who did not recently leave Russia, less people expect difficulties in 
travels abroad. Still, their percentage is still large, counting as much as 65% of 
respondents from this group. Among people travelling from the region to foreign 
countries, similar ratio expects difficulties in travelling into mainland Russia and 
abroad.  
 
Looking at the question about possible changes in family’s financial situation, 46% of 
those who did not leave Russia expected its decrease, compared to 44% among 
those who did travel abroad. It seems interesting that in both groups a similar number 
of people believes that they will loose from the introduction of visas. Perhaps this is a 
result of a general conviction that every change only makes things worse.  
 
People with lower incomes more frequently (55%) than those with higher incomes 
(about 30%) declared that they are concerned about the financial situation of the 
family after the introduction of visas. Analysis made according to respondent’s 
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education levels showed almost no differences in the percentages (a little over 40% 
on average) of respondents who shared pessimistic views about the situation of their 
families after introduction of visas. However, among those who do not expect their 
financial situation to deteriorate, the percentage of answers increased together with 
respondent’s education level. Among people who have not finished secondary 
education, the percentage was equal to 16% compared to 32% of respondents who 
have finished graduate studies. Also the lower the education level, the less the 
respondent was able to answer this question. 38% of those with lowest education 
and only 24 percent of university graduates could not answer the question.   
 
We could expect that there would be some striking differences between the answers 
of those who left or did not leave the region to travel either to Russia or abroad. 
However, the fact that no such differences occurred indicates that opinions of 
respondents from both groups are shaped not only by personal experiences of 
travelling but also by other sources, media campaigns for instance. Perhaps it is also 
important that both those who travel and those who do not travel outside the region 
have incomes so low that every extra expense is a burden for family budgets.  
Moreover, even those who have not recently visited mainland Russia or other 
countries may recognise introduction of visas as a limitation of their potential ability to 
travel. Kaliningrad residents are being flooded with information about the district 
being cut away from the rest of the country and about possible difficulties arising from 
this fact. In this context, they consider changes a threat and a limitation of their 
freedom to choose.  
 
Meanwhile, residents of the region see possible disadvantages of the implementation 
of the Schengen Agreement, which will make it more difficult to travel to mainland 
Russia and other countries and will cause a decrease in the living standards of their 
families. Advantages of the Schengen visa, which would enable its owner to travel to 
many countries, could convince those of Kaliningrad citizens, who travel abroad not 
only in transit to mainland Russia. Our research shows, that attitudes of those 
travelling abroad do not differ from views of those not leaving Russia.  
 
Research findings indicate that every tenth inhabitant of the region left the country at 
least once a year and every fourth one visits mainland Russia several times a year. If 
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we consider the fact that only every third citizen has a passport (25% according to 
European Committee data from September 2002) then the negative attitude of 
Russians toward visas can be better understood.   
 
In respondents’ answers to our questions, the measure of pessimism becomes 
visible in an interesting manner. The older the respondent,  the more often he will 
provide pessimistic answers to questions about the effects of introducing visas. The 
oldest group gave pessimistic answers to three quarters of questions, while 60% of 
answers was pessimistic among the youngest group. Taking into account education, 
it is hard to prove statistically that the level of pessimism decreases inversely with the 
level of education.  Even if this occurs, the ratio of the decrease is insignificant.  
Analysing difficulties that respondents had while answering questions about the 
influence of introduction of visas, we see that the oldest group more frequently was 
unable to give their opinion on the subject of changes in financial situation of their 
family. In the youngest group, average respondent had problems with answering a 
quarter of the questions, compared to one-third of the oldest respondents. Among the 
middle group, respondents were generally able to answer more questions than the 
respondents from the two previously mentioned groups.  It appeared that those who 
are the least educated had problems with answering the questions more frequently 
and on average were unable to answer one-third of all questions.  
 
Research ordered by the President’s special envoy indicates that residents of 
Kaliningrad have difficulties with anticipating the consequences of the introduction of 
visas. When asked whether they are definitely against the implementation of visa 
regime, as many as 71% of the respondents answered that they do not know. 14% of 
the respondents said that the region is part of Russian territory and 5% mentioned a 
possible increase in the bureaucratisation of procedures at the border and difficulties 
in travelling. Only 1% of respondents mentioned economic difficulties, which could 
arise in the region after introduction of visas. This shows that it is really difficult for 
Kaliningrad residents to understand what sort of risk the visas pose, and thus proves 
that insufficient information is available to Kaliningrad residents19. 
 
                                                 
19 Kaliningradskaya problyema… , op.cit. 
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When answering the question about the evaluation of Moscow’s activity regarding 
freedom of movement to Russia proper, most of Kaliningrad’s residents responded 
that they are convinced that government did not do enough.  Approximately 63% of 
the respondents believe that Russian government did not use all available measures 
to facilitate contacts between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad. 
  
 
Table 4. Do you believe that Russian government used all means at its disposal to 
facilitate contacts between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad district?  
 
Respondents answers                 Percentage of answers 
Yes        11 
 
Rather yes        10 
 
Not really        22 
 
No        41 
 
It is hard to tell        16 
 
 
Source: IPA data. 
 
 
This might be due to the fact that official statements continuously state fundamental 
issues and few concrete solutions emerge despite the ever closer date of EU 
enlargement. Still, residents of the region do not blame for future difficulties solely the 
EU member states or candidate countries.  
 
Seen in the light of the unusual situation of the Kaliningrad region, its residents 
believe that authorities of the Russian Federation should treat it differently. As many 
as eight out of ten residents responded that way. According to local commentators, it 
is the bureaucracy of central authorities that blocks development of the region, does 
not take into regard its specific situation, and therefore provokes oppositional 
attitudes in the society.  We must remember that special privileges granted in 1991 to 
Kaliningrad within the framework of Free Economy Zone have been gradually 
reduced and some of them have never been implemented.  
 
 
However, these findings cannot be considered proof of a hypothesis that Kaliningrad 
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residents want to be separated from mainland Russia. Residents are mostly 
immigrants from the territory of the former USSR and their awareness of territorial 
separation stems from the fact that after Soviet Union’s demise, Kaliningrad’s 
territory was separated from Russia proper by the territories of now sovereign 
countries.  
 
 
Table 5. Do you believe that the district should be granted special status within the 
RF due to its geographical and strategic situation?  
 
Respondents answers                    Percentage of respondents 
Yes             68 
Rather yes             14 
Not really              4 
No              6 
It is hard to tell              8 
 
Source: IPA data. 
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Recommendations 
 
 
 
European Union activities towards the Kaliningrad region have to be conducted 
carefully, taking into account Russia’s internal politics. After all, they will affect 
territorial integrity of Russia, which the government in Russia considers one of key 
national issues. Accusations of fuelling separatist activity in the region should be 
avoided. Instead, a negative image of the European Union present among 
Kaliningrad residents should be changed. This goal can be attained with a broad 
information programme, reaching a wide range of social groups: school children, 
students, businessmen and representatives of local administration. Organisations 
supported by the EU should also strive to reach as many residents as possible with 
the goal of showing them, that EU enlargement carries benefits also for them. One 
should not forget that key decisions will continue to be made by the government in 
Moscow, and it is there that all specific proposals should be directed. It is not 
advisable to try to pressure Moscow to effect changes in its position towards the 
Kaliningrad region. It seems more profitable to slowly create accomplished facts, and 
in this way improve situation of local economy and the attitudes of residents. The 
situation in the region should also be monitored, so that the events do not take an 
unexpected and unwelcome turn. 
 
Recommendations concern following issues: information and education, society and 
culture, politics and economy. 
 
• Our research proved the existence of a large percentage of residents with a 
negative attitude towards EU enlargement, who see the future in a pessimistic 
manner. A large group of badly informed people also exists. An active information 
strategy can help solve these issues. The information centers should be opened 
with this goal in mind and consulates of EU countries should also be used. These 
would be responsible for conducting an information programme about the EU, 
which would use different channels to reach different groups. For example, 
leaflets with appropriate information could be included with the Facilitated Transit 
Documents (FTDs). Such a campaign would have as its goal a change of the 
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negative image of EU, predominant in Russian media and presented by some 
Russian politicians during negotiations with the EU. 
 
• In this context, it becomes important to appropriately manage the TACIS fund, 
which should be used to train Kaliningrad specialists dealing with EU issues. The 
fund should be used to further develop the department of European studies at 
the local university. Staff educated in this manner could then be used for different 
EU enterprises. The possibility of using EU support by local organisations would 
also increase. Finally, trained specialists could themselves conduct trainings for 
businessmen. 
 
• Information about initiatives concerning cooperation, both international and 
regional, should be published on regularly updated web pages, prepared in 
Russian, Lithuanian and Polish, so that interested persons would have easy 
access to them.  
 
• A representative of the region should be stationed in Brussels, be it a 
representative of the local government or business organisations. 
 
• Contacts made by the local government with partners in border regions of Poland 
and Lithuania are for the region an important factor in international politics. They 
should be encouraged to develop different form of cooperation. 
 
• It is desired to promote tourism from and to the Kaliningrad region. A low fee for 
entry visas to Russia should be negotiated, so that travelers from the EU would 
be motivated to visit the region. Efforts should also be made to make visas for 
Russian citizens affordable, in effect combating region’s isolation.  
 
• European Union should become involved in fighting social pathologies, such as 
drug and alcohol addiction. It should also participate in combating health risks, 
such as the AIDS epidemic. 
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• Organisations associated with the EU should become patrons of all sorts of 
cultural events. It is also worthwhile to stimulate artistic and scientific exchange, 
especially in territories near the border. 
 
• Attempts should be made to enliven region’s economy. Enforcement of Schengen 
regulations will most probably limit the informal economy, depriving a significant 
group of people on both sides of the border of their income. An EU credit 
guarantees programme for medium size investors should provide incentives to 
invest in Kaliningrad. Meetings between Polish, Lithuanian and Russian 
businessmen could help in strengthening economic exchange and should 
therefore be intensified. 
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